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ABSTRACT
This Article undertakes the first systematic investigation of trademark
dilution in registration practice before the US Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). The Article consists of three distinct descriptive empirical analyses. In the first, I present a new hand-coded dataset of all 453
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dispositions of dilution
claims through June 30, 2014, and report that dilution has been necessary to the PTO’s refusal of exactly three registrations in over a decade. In the second part, I apply algorithmic coding of the recently
released PTO Casefiles Dataset to demonstrate that concurrent registration of identical marks to different registrants in different product
classes is a long-standing feature of the registration system that does
not appear to have changed with the advent of anti-dilution rights. In
the third part, I examine third-party applications to register famous
marks, and find some suggestion that anti-dilution rights coincide with
a modest decrease in the success of such applications—more likely due
to an increased rate of abandonment by applicants than to increased
opposition by prior registrants. But this change, even if it is not illusory, would correspond to at most an additional 5 to 30 rejected applications per year, against an annual volume of as many as 200,000
applications for word marks in general. While additional research may
help buttress the case that anti-dilution rights have had a modest effect
on registration for a very narrow class of marks, I conclude that their
primary effect appears to be imposing increased costs on those who
have business with the trademark system, with little if any apparent
benefit to justify those costs.
*
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INTRODUCTION
For most of the twentieth century, the organized trademark bar persistently lobbied at the state and federal level for statutory recognition of an
anti-dilution right1—the right to relief against non-competing, non-confusing
uses of a trademark by persons or entities other than its owner. In the late
1990s, after decades of only middling successes at the state level, these efforts bore fruit in the form of a new federal trademark dilution statute, which
has now been amended multiple times since its original passage.2 The advent
of federal anti-dilution protection could have been the single most significant innovation in American trademark law in the past two decades. But by
1.
2.

See infra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
See id.; see also infra notes 24–28, 57–60 and accompanying text.
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most accounts, anti-dilution claims in the federal courts have been at best
superfluous and at worst a failure.3
Still, judicial enforcement of trademark rights is only one piece of the
trademark system. Registration affords significant rights under federal trademark law, and to date there has been no systematic4 analysis of how (if at
all) federal dilution law has affected registration practice at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). This article offers the first such analysis. I conclude that, as in the courts, dilution appears to have been largely
(though perhaps not entirely) a failure at the PTO. In any event, it appears
unlikely that any effect of dilution law on the registration system could justify its costs.
My analysis has three principal components. First, to determine the effect of anti-dilution rights in contested registration proceedings, I created a
new hand-coded dataset of all reported Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) opinions disposing of dilution claims or proceedings in which such
claims were asserted, and report on the nature and grounds of disposition. I
show that, out of the over four hundred dispositive TTAB opinions issued,
dilution has been necessary to the TTAB’s rejection of exactly three (3)
applications for registration over the doctrine’s fifteen-year history.5 Second,
using algorithmic coding of a new data set released by the PTO in early
2013 (the PTO Dataset), I report descriptive findings regarding the behavior
of applicants for trademark registrations, owners of existing registrations,
and government decision-makers at the PTO both before and after the advent
of federal dilution law. While the data are somewhat ill-suited to the task,
this analysis suggests that the advent of dilution law does not appear to coincide with any significant change in behavior of, or results for, any of the
players in the trademark registration system.6 Put simply, the registration of
identical marks to different parties in different product classes appears to be
a long-standing and stable feature of American trademark practice. Third
and finally, I collate the PTO Dataset with commercial data on well-known
brands to examine the effect of anti-dilution protection on third-party efforts
to register famous marks (the class of marks to which anti-dilution rights are
limited by statute).7 This analysis suggests that famous marks were under
3.
See infra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
4.
For a practitioner-oriented assessment of strategies for pursuing dilution claims
before the TTAB, see generally John L. Welch, Dilution at the TTAB: What to Prove and How
to Prove It, ALLEN’S TRADEMARK DIG., Jan. 2004, at 9, available at http://home.comcast.net/
~jlw28129/Dilution_at_the_TTAB.pdf. For a similar “recent developments” assessment of important dilution decisions by the TTAB, see generally Alisa C. Simmons, Trademark Dilution
Developments from the TTAB, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 37 (2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2012_13/november_december/trademark_dilu
tion_developments_the_ttab.html.
5.
See infra Part II.
6.
See infra Part III.
7.
See infra Part IV.
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very little threat at the PTO prior to the advent of dilution law, and that
dilution law, at best, may have marginally improved their already secure
status.
Based on these three descriptive empirical investigations, I argue that
dilution law is doing very little real work in the registration system—principally because there is very little work for it to do. If there is an effect of
dilution claims on registration outcomes, it appears to be limited to truly
famous marks (and even then it appears to be a rather small effect). Still,
anti-dilution rights appear to be invoked fairly frequently, though almost always fruitlessly, as the analysis of TTAB opinions suggests. This is inherently costly both to those who assert dilution claims and to those who defend
against such claims. Thus, I conclude my investigation with a critique of
dilution law, but not (or not only) along the typical lines of previous academic scholarship, which has argued that it affords trademark owners overbroad rights. Rather, I argue that federal dilution law has simply been a
tremendous waste of the time, effort, and resources of those who have business with the registration system, to a degree far outweighing any benefit of
anti-dilution protection. Thus, I argue that it is in the interests of the overwhelming majority of current and future trademark owners to remove dilution issues from registration practice.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a historical and theoretical overview of trademark dilution law in the United States, reviews the
history of dilution in the federal courts, and explains the particular doctrines
and authorities relevant to anti-dilution rights in the registration system. Part
II sets forth the aforementioned empirical analysis of all the TTAB’s dispositive dilution opinions through the end of 2013. Part III undertakes algorithmic analysis of the PTO Dataset (while also reviewing limitations
imposed by the data), and reports the results of that analysis. Part IV reports
my analysis of applications to register “famous” marks. I conclude by arguing that dilution claims in the registration system likely impose more costs
than are justified by their modest and potentially illusory benefits, and by
identifying avenues for future research.
I. AN OVERVIEW

OF

DILUTION LAW

Dilution has had a tortuous history in American trademark law, and an
even more tortuous history in the registration system. In this Part, I provide
an overview of that history, describe the trademark registration process, and
summarize doctrinal developments from the application of dilution law to
registration.
A. Theory and Origins
American trademark law in the early 20th century conferred a fairly
narrow set of rights on trademark owners. The Trademark Act of 1905 gave
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trademark owners the right to prevent others from “reproduc[ing], counterfeit[ing], copy[ing], or colorably imitat[ing]” their registered mark on goods
of “substantially the same descriptive properties” as the goods for which the
mark was registered.8 In the early years under the 1905 Act, these rights
were roughly commensurate with what is currently known in international
trademark law as the “double identity” basis for trademark enforcement9—
the right to prevent others from using an identical mark on identical goods.
Over time, courts liberalized their interpretation of the “same descriptive
properties” standard to permit enforcement of trademarks against third parties using the mark on related but not directly competitive goods.10 But during this transition, courts frequently frustrated trademark owners and their
lawyers with a refusal to enforce a trademark outside of the very narrowly
defined range of products for which the mark owner was actually using it, on
the theory that the owner could not demonstrate the competitive injury of
lost sales.11 These cases often observed that a claim of “unfair competition,”
the common law source of trademark rights, presupposes that the parties
actually compete with one another.12
This was the state of the law when Frank Schecter, a trademark attorney
in New York, became one of the first doctoral candidates in law at Columbia
University and the first recipient of its Doctor of Jurisprudence degree.13 In
1927, two years after publishing his dissertation on the history of trade8.
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728, repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-459, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in various sections of
15 U.S.C.).
9.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, art. 16, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 306, 33 I.L.M. 81, 89 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“In case of the use of an
identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.”);
see also Directive 2008/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008
to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299)
25, 29 (stating that trade mark registrants have the right to prevent others from using “any sign
which is identical with the trademark in relation to goods or services which are identical with
those for which the trade mark is registered”).
10.
See generally Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 201–02 (1927) (describing
this shift).
11.
See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (“If he
does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and stamps a lion on his linen,
another person may stamp a lion on iron.”) (quoting Ainsworth v. Walmsley, 1 L.R.Eq. 518,
524 (1866)); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir.
1912) (holding a trademark registered for use on milk, cream, condensed milk, and related
products not enforceable against a maker of ice cream).
12.
Borden, 201 F. at 514 (“The phrase ‘unfair competition’ presupposes competition of
some sort.”); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967, 970 (3d Cir. 1925)
(“Generically, the term ‘unfair competition’ presupposes competition of some kind.”); Lukens,
supra note 10, at 198 & n.4.
13.
See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING
TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (Schechter’s published dissertation); Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s
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marks, Schecter published an article in the Harvard Law Review entitled The
Rational Basis for Trade Mark Protection.14 In it, he proposed a radical departure from the trademark doctrines of his day, arguing that trademark
law’s true purpose was to protect the “uniqueness and singularity” of a
mark—and thus its “selling power”—against an evil called “dilution.”15 Dilution, Schechter argued, is the injury that results from the “gradual whittling
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark
or name by its use upon non-competing goods.”16
“Schechter’s ideas received a remarkably positive, if relatively mild, reception in the decade after publication of Rational Basis.”17 But his dilution
theory did not become a basis for federal trademark rights, which came to
accommodate the demand for enforcement against noncompeting goods by
instead holding that the misappropriation or endangering of a mark owner’s
goodwill could be a basis for an infringement action.18 By the time the Lanham Act was enacted twenty years later, the even broader and more malleable notion of consumer confusion had become the basis for trademark
infringement claims against related but non-competing goods.19
B. Congress and the Courts
As the likelihood-of-confusion test expanded federal trademark infringement liability well beyond the scope of direct competition over the course of
the twentieth century, state legislatures slowly but steadily enacted their own
anti-dilution statutes under aggressive lobbying by their local trademark
bars.20 But “[m]ost judges in the 1950s and 1960s refused to apply the state
statutes broadly, insisting instead that trademark owners offer some proof of
likely confusion in dilution cases.”21 Nevertheless, dilution remained attractive to trademark owners because it offered the promise of enforcing trademark rights “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.”22 Eventually, furIdeas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 469, 474 (2008) (describing Schechter’s career).
14.
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade Mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
814 (1927).
15.
Id. at 830–33.
16.
Id. at 825.
17.
Bone, supra note 13, at 495.
18.
See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1899–1904 (2007).
19.
See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 593–96 (2006).
20.
See Bone, supra note 13, at 496–504.
21.
Id. at 505.
22.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012); see also Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-98, § 4, 105 Stat. 985, 986 (1996) [hereinafter FTDA] (providing a similar definition of dilution under the earlier version of the federal dilution statute).
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ther lobbying by the organized trademark bar23 led to the enactment of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA).24
The FTDA received a chilly reception from the federal courts. By 2006,
Professor Clarisa Long reported that “[j]udicial enforcement of dilution law
is not robust today and has been eroding over time.”25 This was the same
year in which Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
(TDRA),26 a statute expressly designed to abrogate27 the Supreme Court’s
pro-defendant ruling in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.28 But early reports suggest that the TDRA failed to reverse the trend, which Professor
Barton Beebe described as a “debacle” for dilution plaintiffs: “[C]ourts’ dilution determinations are largely redundant of their infringement determinations, and . . . the former fail to yield any remedies not already provided by
the latter.”29 While dilution claims continue to be asserted as a matter of
course—perhaps simply as a makeweight30—in trademark litigation, it
seems that academic “focus on dilution . . . is hugely disproportionate to [its]
practical significance.”31
At the risk of aggravating this disproportionality, this Article examines
one aspect of dilution law that has attracted no scholarly attention to date: its
role in the federal registration system. The federal anti-dilution statutes operate differently for registration than they do for litigation. The extent to which
outcomes in the administrative arena differ from those in the judicial arena
may thus inform future policymaking, to the extent dilution law continues to
be the subject of policy debate. As this study shows, dilution law appears to
be as much of a debacle at the PTO as it is in the courts.
C. The Registration Process32
Registration of a trademark on the Principal Register affords registrants
some valuable rights not available at common law. Registration provides
nationwide constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the
23.
See Jerre B. Swann, Sr., INTA and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 159, 159 (2003).
24.
FTDA, supra note 22, at 985.
25.
Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2006).
26.
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006).
27.
See 152 CONG. REC. 2941–42 (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (describing
the TDRA as a measure to clarify Congressional intent in the wake of Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), and undo the central holding of that case).
28.
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
29.
Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the
First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 459 (2008).
30.
See Long, supra note 25, at 1054.
31.
Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 63, 66–67 (2009).
32.
This summary of the registration process elides the distinctions between use-based,
intent-to-use, and foreign-filing-basis applications. While these distinctions are quite important
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mark,33 and the Lanham Act makes such notice a prerequisite to the recovery
of damages for infringement.34 Registration also establishes nationwide priority of right to use the registered mark in connection with the goods or
services for which it is registered.35 It provides prima facie evidence of the
mark’s validity and of the registrant’s right to use the mark in connection
with those same goods or services.36 After a period of five consecutive years
of use following registration, a registration may obtain “incontestable” status.37 Though incontestability does not actually immunize the mark from
challenge,38 it does constitute “conclusive evidence” of the registrant’s right
to use the mark and limits the possible grounds for its invalidation.39
When an application for a federal registration is submitted, it is assigned
to an examiner—a PTO employee—who reviews the application for compliance with certain technical40 and substantive41 requirements.42 If the examining attorney finds grounds for refusing the registration, he or she will issue
an “office action” informing the applicant of the refusal and providing the
reasons therefor; the applicant may then reply to the examiner’s reasons or
amend the application to attempt to moot the grounds for refusal.43 This
process can be repeated several times until the examiner either approves the
application or issues a final refusal.44
An applicant disappointed in a final refusal may appeal the examining
attorney’s decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), an
administrative tribunal of the PTO.45 The TTAB’s ruling may be further appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) on the
record generated in PTO proceedings,46 or may be challenged in a civil action in federal district court (where additional discovery may be taken and
new evidence submitted).47
in registration practice, they are not particularly relevant to dilution, which can only be raised
after publication of an application. See infra notes 48–60 and accompanying text.
33.
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2012).
34.
Id. § 1111.
35.
Id. § 1057(c).
36.
Id. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a).
37.
Id. § 1065.
38.
See id. § 1115(b) (setting forth grounds for contesting an “incontestable”
registration).
39.
Id.; see also Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985)
(holding an incontestable registration may only be challenged on grounds specified in the
Lanham Act).
40.
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP ch. 800
(Apr. 2014).
41.
15 U.S.C. § 1052; TMEP ch. 1200.
42.
15 U.S.C. § 1062; TMEP ch. 700.
43.
15 U.S.C. § 1062; TMEP ch. 700.
44.
15 U.S.C. § 1062; TMEP ch. 700.
45.
15 U.S.C. § 1070; TMEP § 1501; TBMP § 102.
46.
15 U.S.C. § 1071(a).
47.
Id. § 1071(b).
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If the examiner finds no barrier to the registration, or is satisfied by the
applicant’s arguments or amendments in response to a negative office action,
the application will be approved for publication in the Official Gazette of the
PTO.48 Publication provides interested parties with notice and an opportunity
to be heard prior to the registration issuing. “Any person who believes that
he would be damaged by the registration” has thirty days from publication to
oppose the registration, which triggers an inter partes proceeding before the
TTAB at which any grounds for refusing registration may be litigated.49 If a
published application is not successfully opposed, the applied-for mark
“shall be registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a certificate of registration shall be issued, and notice of the registration shall be published in
the Official Gazette. . . .”50
Finally, even after a registration issues, it may be susceptible to cancellation if abandoned or later determined to be invalid. Such cancellation can
be the result of an inter partes cancellation proceeding before the TTAB,
which may be initiated by “any person who believes that he is or will be
damaged . . . by the registration.”51 A cancellation proceeding may be initiated at any time after registration, though as noted above the permissible
grounds for such a proceeding narrow as a registration ages.52 Cancellation
may also be ordered by an Article III court in a lawsuit involving a federal
registration, for example where a defendant successfully asserts invalidity as
a defense in a trademark infringement or dilution action.53
The substantive bars to registration are found in Section 2 of the Lanham Act.54 One such bar is that the mark applied for would cause dilution of
a famous mark—as defined under Section 43(c) of the Act—if used on the
goods or services for which it is claimed in the application.55
D. Dilution Doctrine at the PTO
Dilution is unique among the substantive bars to registration in that it
may not be raised sua sponte by an examiner as a basis for refusal to register. Rather, dilution will only bar registration if raised in an inter partes
opposition or cancellation proceeding.56 Indeed, even this was not always
permissible; upon the passage of the FTDA, no express provision was made
for considering dilution in the registration process, and the TTAB held at an
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 1062(a); TMEP § 1502.
15 U.S.C. § 1063; TMEP § 1503.
15 U.S.C. § 1063(b); TMEP § 1502.
15 U.S.C. § 1064; TMEP § 1607.
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(1)–(3).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1119.
15 U.S.C. § 1052.
Id. §§ 1052, 1125(c).
Id.
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early date that the statute did not give the PTO authority to do so.57 In the
wake of this ruling, the organized trademark bar again lobbied for a broader
dilution law.58 In 1999 they prevailed, convincing Congress to explicitly
make dilution a permissible basis for opposition or cancellation of a registration as part of the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 (TAA).59 The effective date of the TAA is therefore the most obvious date at (or around) which
we might expect to see anti-dilution protections having an impact in the
registration system.60
Common-law developments at the TTAB and CAFC and Congressional
tinkering with the dilution statute have affected its role in the registration
system over time. Some of the more notable doctrinal developments include:
1. Pleading Standards
Once dilution became a permissible ground for opposition or cancellation of a registration, the relevant authorities came to develop standards for
what facts must be pleaded to state a dilution claim. In particular, the TTAB
and CAFC held that the FTDA’s language required a dilution claimant to
plead (and ultimately prove) not only that its mark is famous, but that it had
become famous prior to any use (or the filing of an intent-to-use application)
of the mark by the applicant or registrant being challenged.61 As shown below in Part II, practitioners before the TTAB have not been especially
scrupulous in adhering to this fairly simple pleading requirement.
2. Proving Fame
For some time under the FTDA, there was judicial debate as to whether
a mark that enjoyed fame only in a limited or “niche” market was “famous”
enough to be protected under the statute.62 That question was laid to rest by
57.
Babson Bros. Co. v. Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) 1953 (T.T.A.B.
1996); see also Chock Full O’Nuts Corp. v. Calgene, Inc., 1996 TTAB LEXIS 52, at *6 n.6
(T.T.A.B. June 19, 1996).
58.
See generally Trademark Amendments Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1565 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
62-504 (1999) (record of hearing at which all witnesses—including three representatives of
intellectual property bar associations—testified in favor of making dilution a basis for opposing or cancelling a registration).
59.
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999)
[hereinafter TAA].
60.
However, these changes may affect applications filed as early as the effective date
of the FTDA. See Boral Ltd. v. FMC Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1703 (T.T.A.B.
2000) (“We conclude that the 1999 Act explicitly permits retroactive application so as to allow
oppositions, brought against applications filed on or after January 16, 1996, to be amended to
include dilution claims.”).
61.
See Polaris Indus. Inc. v. DC Comics, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1800 (T.T.A.B.
2000); Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1175 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
62.
See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:105 (4th ed. 2013).
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the TDRA, which requires fame among the “general consuming public” of
the United States, as recognized by the Federal Circuit.63 Aside from settling
the “niche fame” question, this interpretation also means that a “wellknown” mark within the meaning of international trademark law64 is not
entitled to anti-dilution protection under federal law unless it is also “famous” within the United States.65 Moreover, the TTAB and CAFC have
made this standard rather difficult to meet. Strictly enforcing the requirement
that fame must precede the would-be registrant’s first use of a mark, the
TTAB has refused to draw inferences of fame from evidence post-dating that
use.66 More generally, the TTAB has warned would-be dilution claimants
that they ought not be hopeful of their chances:
Fame for dilution purposes is difficult to prove. . . . In effect, an
owner of a famous mark is attempting to demonstrate that the English language has changed. . . . [T]he mark’s owner must demonstrate that the common or proper noun uses of the term and thirdparty uses of the mark are now eclipsed by the owner’s use of the
mark. What was once a common noun, a surname, a simple trademark, etc., is now a term the public primarily associates with the
famous mark. To achieve this level of fame and distinctiveness, the
party must demonstrate that the mark has become the principal
meaning of the word. . . . Therefore, an opposer . . . must provide
evidence that when the public encounters opposer’s mark in almost
any context, it associates the term, at least initially, with the mark’s
owner.67
As shown below in Part II,68 it is exceedingly rare for a litigant to meet
this standard.

63.
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“By using the ‘general consuming public’ as the benchmark, the TDRA eliminated the possibility of ‘niche fame,’ which some courts had recognized under the previous version of the
statute.”).
64.
See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20
1883, 32.4 U.S.T. 4530, 828 U.N.T.S. 325, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%20828/volume-828-I-11851-English.pdf; TRIPS, supra note 9.
65.
See Fiat Group Autos. S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1113
(T.T.A.B. 2010); cf. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Although the term ‘famous marks’ is often used to describe marks that qualify for protection
under the federal anti-dilution statute, the ‘famous marks’ doctrine is, in fact, a different and
distinct ‘legal concept’” (internal citations omitted)).
66.
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1612
(T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d in relevant part, 668 F.3d 1356, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[M]any of the
articles submitted are dated after Triumph filed its registration applications and thus do not
show that CSI’s mark was famous prior to the filing date.”) (emphasis in original).
67.
Toro Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1180–81 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
68.
See infra Part II.
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3. Similarity
The degree of similarity between the parties’ marks required to support
a dilution claim under the original FTDA was extremely high:
For dilution purposes, a party must prove more than confusing similarity; it must show that the marks are identical or very or substantially similar. The test for blurring is not the same as for
determining whether two marks are confusingly similar for likelihood of confusion purposes. To support an action for dilution by
blurring, the marks must be similar enough that a significant segment of the target group sees the two marks as essentially the
same.69
After passage of the TDRA, the TTAB announced in Nike, Inc. v.
Maher70 that it was loosening this standard somewhat to conform to new
statutory language, allowing a dilution claim against “a ‘look-alike’ mark,
one that is close enough to the famous mark that consumers will recall the
famous mark and be reminded of it.”71
4. Noncommercial Use
One often-expressed concern about anti-dilution rights is that they might
be so broad as to impermissibly proscribe or chill constitutionally protected
expression that evokes a well-known trademark.72 Accordingly, some courts
have attempted to erect a fence around such uses by broadly construing the
federal dilution statute’s “noncommercial use” exception to dilution liability.73 The TTAB has held, however, that this concern is not relevant to disputes over registrability. Reasoning that the right to register a trademark is
premised on the use of the mark in commerce, the Board has held that the
“noncommercial use” defense is categorically inapplicable to dilution claims
asserted in an opposition or cancellation proceeding.74 This interpretation is
notably at odds with Judge Kozinski’s influential interpretation of the “noncommercial use” exception as extending to any use of a trademark that is not
pure “commercial speech” under the First Amendment.75
This categorical rule has not been an explicit basis for disposition of any
inter partes proceeding since the TTAB announced it in 2010. However, as
69.
Toro, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1183 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
70.
100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
71.
Id. at 1030.
72.
See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 558–61 (2008); Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right
To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003).
73.
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904–07 (9th Cir. 2002).
74.
Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. Corp. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294,
1298–1300 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
75.
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 904–07.
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will be shown below in Part II, two of the only three cases where dilution
has been necessary to the TTAB’s rejection of an application for registration
involved applications for joke or parody trademarks.76 Thus, the exclusion of
an applicant’s expressive interests from dilution analysis may in fact generate some of the “chilling” of expression that some dilution critics have
warned against.
5. The Registration Defense
In 2011, an article in the Trademark Reporter noted that a clerical error
in the text of the TDRA inadvertently created a complete defense against
cancellation of a live federal registration on grounds of dilution.77 A year
later, in a case of first impression, the TTAB held that this “registration
defense” did indeed preclude cancellation on dilution grounds (though some
cancellation proceedings asserting dilution among other claims had been entertained in the six years since the TDRA’s passage).78 Congress eliminated
the registration defense with a technical amendment shortly after the TTAB
decision.79 But for proceedings commenced between October 6, 2006 and
October 5, 2012, cancellation of a federal registration on grounds of dilution
was technically impossible. As it turns out, this drafting error in the statute
appears to have been a non-issue—to this day no cancellation petition before
the TTAB has ever been granted on grounds of dilution.80 Moreover, the fact
that it took six years for this statutory drafting error to be identified,
presented, adjudicated, and finally resolved offers a hint at the ultimate finding of this Article: that dilution law has been doing very little work in the
registration system.
II. DILUTION

AT THE

TTAB: A DESCRIPTIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
ORIGINAL TTAB DATASET

OF AN

Doctrinal analysis is helpful in identifying key issues in litigating dilution claims before the PTO, but to understand the aggregate effect of dilution
law on the registration system, a more comprehensive empirical approach is
called for. My first effort at such an approach examines decisions of the
TTAB disposing of fully litigated dilution claims. Notwithstanding that such
TTAB opinions may present all the selection biases typical of judicial opin76.
See infra notes 99–109 and accompanying text.
77.
See Timothy A. Lemper & Joshua R. Bruce, The Dilution Defense Congress Never
Meant to Create (And Needs to Fix), 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1580, 1580 (2011).
78.
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Alliance of Prof’ls & Consultants Inc., 104
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1234 (T.T.A.B. 2012).
79.
Trademark Act of 1946 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 112-190, 126 Stat. 1436 (2012).
80.
See infra App. A.

92

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 21:79

ions,81 they seem a useful place to start when trying to understand the registration system’s experience with dilution law, as they constitute the most
visible and tangible result of that experience. Analysis of these opinions
demonstrates that despite being frequently raised and litigated, dilution
claims almost never affect the result of a vigorously contested application
for registration.
I have created a hand-coded dataset based on review of every hit in
Westlaw’s FTP-TTAB database and Lexis’s Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board Decisions database for the expanded search term “dilut!” in the period
from the date of passage of the FTDA to June 30, 2014.82 This constitutes a
total of 905 opinions from Westlaw (including a small number of duplicates)
plus an additional 62 unique opinions from Lexis’s database that were not
present in Westlaw’s database. The dataset also includes five additional
opinions available on the TTAB’s online docketing system that I discovered
through review of the opinions in the commercial databases, for a total of
972 cases reviewed.83 From these 972 cases, I identified and coded all 453

81.
See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (modeling such selection effects using economic
analysis).
82.
The dataset is publicly available in .dta format at http://goo.gl/fCuV6Q.
83.
A few of the opinions in the Westlaw search results make reference to earlier opinions in the same matters which disposed of a dilution claim, but did not appear in the Lexis or
Westlaw search results despite containing the search term and being within the reported coverage periods of the databases. Compare United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Unigroup Worldwide, Inc., 2012 WL 1267951, at *1 n.8 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2012), D’Ascoli v. Omni Sports
Int’l, Inc., 2009 WL 1692517, at *6 (T.T.A.B. May 13, 2009), Utopy, Inc. v. CallMiner, Inc.,
2008 WL 2619545, at *7 n.3 (T.T.A.B. June 19, 2008), and Intel Corp. v. Emeny, 2007 WL
1520948, at *2 (T.T.A.B. May 15, 2007), with United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Unigroup
Worldwide, Inc., Opp. No. 91175419, slip op. at 6–7 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2008), available at
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-91175419-OPP-34.pdf, D’Ascoli v. Omni Sports Int’l,
Inc., Opp. No. 91154277, slip op. at 6–7 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://
ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91154277&pty=OPP&eno=48, Utopy, Inc. v. CallMiner,
Inc., Opp. No. 91168109, slip op. at 5 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://
ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91168109&pty=OPP&eno=32, Utopy, Inc. v. CallMiner,
Inc., Opp. No. 91166270, slip op. (T.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://ttabvue.uspto
.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-91166270-OPP-42.pdf, and Intel Corp. v. Emeny, Opp. No. 91123312
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91123312&pty
=OPP&eno=45. I have added these earlier opinions to the dataset, but because the TTAB’s
own online repository of its case files is not publicly full-text-searchable, I cannot be certain
that all such missing opinions are accounted for. For example, it appears that in one matter, a
motion to amend a notice of opposition to include a dilution claim was denied (presumably
under the rule of Babson Bros. Co. v. Surge Power Corp.), but that denial does not appear in
either commercial database nor is it available through the PTOs own online docketing system.
See Interdigital Comm. v. Shaw Indus. Ltd., 2000 TTAB LEXIS 520, at *1 n.2 (T.T.A.B. July
28, 2000). Thus, while the dataset should be reasonably comprehensive, there is some reason
to believe it may not be entirely complete, and there does not appear to be any way of knowing
if there is any systematic omission of certain types of opinions.
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unique opinions that were dispositive84 of either a dilution claim85 or an entire inter partes proceeding in which a dilution claim was raised.86 These
453 opinions can further be divided into 398 opposition proceedings, 49
cancellation proceedings, and six opinions involving both an opposition and
a petition to cancel in one consolidated proceeding.87
I have coded each disposition according to whether the dilution claim
prevailed, failed, or was not reached due to disposition on other grounds.
With regard to claims that were adjudicated and prevailed, I have coded
whether the claim prevailed on the merits or rather as a result of the applicant’s default. With regard to claims that were adjudicated and failed, I have
coded whether the failure was on a procedural ground (such as insufficient
pleading or waiver for failure to brief or argue the claim) or on the merits of
the claim (such as failure to establish sufficient fame or similarity). In many
cases the TTAB will offer multiple grounds for its disposition, which means
a single opinion may appear more than once in the coding results. For example, in one case, the Board stated that it need not reach a dilution claim due
to a finding that confusion was likely, then also stated that the dilution claim
was inadequately pleaded and proven in any event;88 this case was coded as
positive for three indicator variables: failure to reach the dilution claim, dismissal for inadequate pleading, and waiver for failure to brief, try, or argue
84.
By “dispositive,” I am referring to opinions which resolve a claim or proceeding at
trial or summary judgment, grants of motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, as
well as motions denying leave to amend where the denial is grounded in some deficiency of a
pleaded dilution claim (even where the denial is without prejudice).
85.
I interpret “claim” broadly to encompass any assertion of a dilution-based argument
as grounds for refusing or cancelling a registration, even if the claim was not formally or
sufficiently pleaded, so long as the TTAB indicated its understanding that the litigant may
have been attempting to invoke anti-dilution protections.
86.
The reviewed opinions that do not dispose of a dilution claim or its parent proceeding typically involve interlocutory orders, denials of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, or uses of the word “dilution” or “diluted” in irrelevant contexts (such as when
reviewing an examining attorney’s ex parte refusal to register, or discussing third-party uses of
an opposer’s trademark under the TTAB’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis). See, e.g., In re
Application of Hub Distrib., Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 285 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (“[T]hird
party registration evidence proves nothing about the impact of the third-party marks on purchasers in terms of dilution of the mark in question or conditioning of purchasers as to their
weakness in distinguishing source.”).
87.
For some perspective on these figures, consider that in Fiscal Year 2013 the TTAB
decided 676 cases, including ex parte appeals as well as inter partes proceedings; that year the
TTAB received over twice as many filed inter partes proceedings as ex parte appeals (oppositions and cancellation proceedings before the TTAB are inter partes proceedings, while appeals are ex parte, involving only a review by the TTAB of a determination made by the
PTO’s examining attorney, at the request of the applicant). See Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd.,
TTAB Incoming Filings and Performance Measures for Decisions (2013), U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/TTAB_New_Filings_
and_Performance_Measures.jsp (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
88.
Volkswagen AG v. Venture Works Inc., 2008 WL 4354190, at *5 n.6 (T.T.A.B.
Sept. 10, 2008).
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(both procedural dismissals). In another case the Board found that an opposer failed to adequately plead its asserted dilution claim, waived the claim
by failing to brief it, and that the litigant failed to establish the fame of its
mark;89 this case was coded as positive for dismissal for inadequate pleading
and waiver (both procedural dismissals) as well as for dismissal for lack of
fame (a dismissal on the merits). These belt-and-suspenders rationales for
dismissing dilution claims are fairly common, and they can admittedly blur
the issue whether a particular disposition deals with the merits of those
claims.
Figure 1 graphically presents the aggregate results of this coding
process:90
FIGURE 1. DISPOSITIONS

OF

DILUTION CLAIMS BEFORE

THE

TTAB

These results demonstrate that it is not only rare to prevail on a dilution
claim, but that it is fairly rare for the TTAB to even consider the claim on
the merits. Drilling deeper into the finding that nearly half of all dilution
claims end in a procedural dismissal, we find some support for the proposi89.
Learning Annex, LLC v. The Energy Infuser, Inc., 2008 WL 4354199, at *1
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 9, 2008).
90.
A more detailed tabular presentation of the data, including breakouts by proceeding
type, is set forth in Appendix A, infra.
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tion that the strongest determinant of success is simply showing up. Specifically, it appears that opposers and cancellation petitioners often simply omit
pleaded dilution claims from their evidence and argument:91
FIGURE 2. GROUNDS

FOR

PROCEDURAL DISMISSALS

Even dilution claimants are not taking their own dilution claims very
seriously—not seriously enough, at least, to devote attention or resources to
litigating them.
In those cases where a dilution claim does reach a decision on the merits, it tends not to fare very well, as can be seen in Figure 3:92

91.
Percentages are of all instances of a positive result in one of the procedural dismissal indicator variables.
92.
Percentages are of all instances of a positive result in one of the merits dismissal
indicator variables.
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MERITS

Looking at these data as a whole, we can see that there may be good
reason for dilution claimants to neglect the prosecution of their dilution
claims. Of the 453 dispositive opinions coded, a dilution claim has prevailed
on the merits in precisely seven cases.93 In four of those seven, the success
of the dilution claim was entirely superfluous, as it merely duplicated the
result of a Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion claim.94 This includes:

93.
In an additional two cases, the opposer obtained a judgment on its dilution claim
due to the applicant’s abandonment of its application—in one instance after having had the
claim adjudicated against it on the merits at an earlier stage of the proceeding. See Rolex
Watch USA Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 3 (T.T.A.B. 2013);
Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Sharp Circle Consulting, LLC, 2003 WL 22905318, at *2
(T.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2003).
94.
As this article was going to press, one additional proceeding was decided in which
the Board sustained an opposition on both confusion and dilution grounds. McDonalds Corp.
v. McSweet, LLC, 2014 WL 5282256 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 29, 2014). Again, the dilution finding in
that case was entirely superfluous, and the “family of marks” doctrine gave opposer additional
ammunition to defeat the application without resort to anti-dilution rights. This case is not
included in the reported dataset, as it falls outside the collection window ending on June 30,
2014. Several other proceedings involving dilution claims were also disposed of between June
30, 2014 and the publication of this article, but none of them sustained a dilution claim.
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• Nike’s opposition to the registration of JUST JESU IT for
apparel,95
• UMG Recordings’ opposition to the registration of MOTOWN
METAL for toy cars,96
• Warner Brothers’ opposition to the registration of HARRY
POTHEAD for entertainment services,97 and
• The Nasdaq Stock Market’s opposition to the registration of
NASDAQ for sporting equipment and clothing.98
In a fifth case, the dilution claim was almost entirely superfluous. The
Board sustained Blackberry maker Research In Motion’s opposition to registration of CRACKBERRY for various online and computer related services
on both confusion and dilution grounds, but found confusion unlikely to
result from the applicant’s proposed use of CRACKBERRY on apparel. For
that class of goods, the Board instead sustained RIM’s opposition only on
dilution grounds.99 Research in Motion is the only extant case in which the
TTAB has refused registration on dilution grounds to a mark that it found to
be non-confusing. This leaves exactly two cases in which dilution was the
sole ground for sustaining an opposition: National Pork Board v. Supreme
Lobster and Seafood Company,100 and the very recent case of Chanel, Inc. V.
Jerzy Makarczyk.101 But in both of these cases, it is conceivable that registration would have been refused on likelihood of confusion grounds if the
Board had followed its almost universal practice of considering confusion
prior to dilution.
In National Pork Board, the marketing arm of the pork industry opposed
a seafood wholesaler’s application to register THE OTHER RED MEAT for
salmon, on the basis of the opposer’s THE OTHER WHITE MEAT mark for
promoting pork. Notably, the Board did not reach the opposer’s pleaded
likelihood of confusion claim.102 As Table 1 illustrates, this is precisely the
opposite of the Board’s typical practice of considering likelihood of confusion claims first and only turning to dilution claims if necessary to dispose
95.
Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
96.
UMG Recordings Inc. v. Mattel Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d 1868, 1870 (T.T.A.B. 2011).
97.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. Campo, 2006 WL 2850871, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 13,
2006).
98.
NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Antartica, S.r.l., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1718, 1726 (T.T.A.B.
2003).
99.
Research in Motion Ltd. v. Defining Presence Mktg. Grp. Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1187 (T.T.A.B. 2012).
100.
Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479
(T.T.A.B. 2010).
101.
Chanel, Inc. v. Jerzy Makarczyk, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2013 (T.T.A.B. 2014).
102.
Nat’l Pork Bd., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1489 (“Because we have found for opposer in
connection with its likelihood of dilution claim, we do not reach its claim of likelihood of
confusion.”).
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of the proceeding. The staging of the issues in the National Pork Board case
may be a result of the Board’s (unstated) view that the likelihood of confusion claim was a more difficult one for the opposer to make out, given the
differences between the parties’ products, but we simply do not know
whether THE OTHER RED MEAT would have been refused registration on
grounds of likelihood of confusion if that had been the only claim available.
In Chanel there is a much stronger indication that registration would
have been refused on likelihood of confusion grounds had the Board followed its usual practice and reached that issue first (which, as in National
Pork Board, it did not). In Chanel, the applicant sought to register the mark
CHANEL for residential and hotel real estate development and construction
services.103 The case thus presents the classic dilution scenario of a famous
luxury mark being used by an unauthorized third party for its “selling
power,” just as Schechter had feared.104 But unlike in Schechter’s day, the
modern understanding of trademark injuries is based on consumer confusion, and such confusion, for good or for ill, includes confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation.105 The Board noted in Chanel that the applicant had
affirmatively (and falsely) claimed an affiliation with Chanel and other luxury goods companies in his marketing literature.106 The Board also noted
that many luxury goods companies enter licensing arrangements with hotels
and other real-estate-related industries.107 These facts would appear suffi-

103.
110 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2014–15.
104.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
105.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012) (allowing refusal to register marks whose use is likely
“to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TMEP § 1207.01 (April 2013) (“The issue is not whether the respective marks themselves, or the goods or services offered under the marks, are likely to be confused but, rather,
whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the goods or
services because of the marks used thereon.” (citing cases)). For a critique of trademark rights
premised on sponsorship or affiliation confusion, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark
McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
106.
Chanel, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2026 (“According to . . . applicant’s websites, . . . applicant markets luxury rental properties by naming units after luxury brands such as Chanel, Dior,
Givenchy, and Versace. Applicant stated on his web site that opposer Chanel is among his
former or current clients. . . . Indeed, applicant, in promoting his services on his web site, has
referred to the elevated status he purportedly enjoys from his relationship with Chanel. Opposer’s corporate counsel testified however that opposer ‘has not done business with the applicant, nor have we licensed the CHANEL mark to him.’” (internal citations omitted)).
107.
Id. (“We note that although opposer has no current involvement in the real estate or
hotel industry, the record shows that many luxury brand companies have licensed use of their
marks in connection with hotels. In other words, they have found opportunities to commercially exploit the distinctiveness of their marks in those industries. In addition, many other
well-known luxury brands have either expanded into or licensed use of their brand names in
fields outside of the fashion industry that are related to real estate. For example, Versace now
offers interior design services, Fendi provides kitchen design services and Jason Wu markets
designer-styled bathroom fixtures.” (internal citations omitted)).
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cient to support a finding of sponsorship confusion,108 but for whatever reason, the Board again decided to act contrary to typical practice and consider
dilution before confusion in its analysis.
It is also worth noting one common element between two of the three
cases where a dilution claim was necessary to a registration opposer’s success: they are jokes. That is, both CRACKBERRY and THE OTHER RED
MEAT are playful twists on their opposers’ well-known marks. And in the
third case (Chanel), as noted, the Board appeared to have ample reasons for
refusing registration on likelihood of confusion grounds, but never reached
the issue. Thus, to the extent anti-dilution protection adds anything of substance to a trademark owner’s rights within the registration system, it appears to add only the right to prevent others from registering humorous
adaptations of a trademark outside the mark owner’s field of actual use. This
finding would appear to confirm the fears of many dilution critics: that antidilution protection has little to do with protecting the singularity of a wellknown mark and everything to do with chilling third-party expression related to that mark—specifically by preventing others from enjoying (and,
yes, profiting from) a joke at the mark owner’s expense.109
Finally, in addition to these seven cases, there are a small number of
cases in which the TTAB’s dismissal of a dilution claim did not survive
appeal or de novo review in federal district court. Most notable of these is
Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc.,110 in which Nike challenged the TTAB’s
finding that its NIKE mark was insufficiently similar to the applicant’s
claimed NIKEPAL mark for import/export and distributorship services related to laboratory equipment to justify rejecting the application on dilution
grounds.111 Proceeding in a de novo action in the Eastern District of California, Nike introduced new survey evidence tending to refute the TTAB’s
findings of fact regarding likely customer perception of the similarity of the
two marks, and prevailed on that basis.112 This is the only case I have been
able to identify in which the TTAB”s substantive finding on dilution was
later overturned on the merits. To be sure, the TTAB’s dispositions of appli108.
See, e.g., Frank Sinatra Enters., LLC v. Loizon, 2012 WL 4361418, at *9 (T.T.A.B.
Sept. 12, 2012) (finding confusion on grounds that “it is commonplace for performers to expand their product lines to incorporate a diverse set of goods and services to capitalize on the
renown of their names and brands”); Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc. v. Craig, 2010 WL
1233880, at *8 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2010) (finding confusion on grounds that “it would not be
uncommon for consumers to encounter the same trademark being used as a source identifier
for clothing apparel as well as accessory items that would include applicant’s identified
goods”).
109.
See Tushnet, supra note 72, at 554–58; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473, 484–91, 511–12 (2013). See generally Stacey L.
Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003) (discussing the growth of a
“right to evoke” in trademark law).
110.
Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1521 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
111.
Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., 2005 WL 1024833, at *6 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2005).
112.
Nike, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1528–29, n.10.
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cations that were opposed on grounds including dilution have been reversed
or vacated on other substantive grounds,113 as part of a negotiated settlement,114 or on procedural grounds.115 Still, as far as I have been able to determine, no reviewing court has ever reversed a TTAB dismissal of a dilution
claim on the merits on an identical record. And there are several reported
cases where the TTAB’s rejection of a dilution claim was affirmed on
review.116
This analysis suggests that the hundreds of litigated dilution claims
before the TTAB have been a significant waste of time and resources. In
proceedings that reach a final disposition by the TTAB, dilution directly
affects the outcome of less than one percent of the cases in which it is raised.
Moreover, two of the only three examples of anti-dilution claims doing real
work in TTAB opinions vindicate all the direst warnings of academic critics
of anti-dilution rights, while the third could almost certainly have been resolved on likelihood of confusion grounds. Still, a fair number of opposers
and cancellation petitioners do seem willing to go through the trouble of
building a dilution case—or perhaps more to the point, putting their adversaries to the trouble of defending a dilution case—notwithstanding the miniscule likelihood that it will have any effect on the ultimate outcome on the
merits. The cost of all this fruitless litigation to actual trademark owners—
and to those prospective trademark owners who are trying to secure the
rights of registration—is likely substantial, and those costs appear to be almost entirely wasted.

113.
For example, in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s
rejection of a dilution claim on issue preclusion grounds, but did not express any opinion on
the merits of the claim, which is currently suspended as the parties pursue settlement. See
Court’s Order of Dec. 31, 2013, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., Opp.
No. 91175601 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2013), available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/
v?pno=91175601&pty=OPP&eno=36.
114.
See, e.g., Bellsouth Intellectual Prop. Corp. v. VCS Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A.041476
GK, 2004 WL 2475558, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2004) (consent judgment including a stipulated
finding that the applicant’s mark would dilute the opposer’s mark).
115.
See, e.g., Rolex Watch USA Inc. v. AFP Imaging Corp., 107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1626 (T.T.A.B. 2013); Blue Man Prods., Inc. v. Tarmann, No. Civ.A.052037, 2008 WL
6862402, at *3 (D.D.C Apr. 3, 2008) (applicant who prevailed before the TTAB defaulted in
de novo action, resulting in cancellation).
116.
See, e.g., Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 888 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va.
2012), aff’d, 739 F.3d 150, 163 (4th Cir. 2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012); FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. CareFirst of Maryland,
Inc., 479 F.3d 825 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 330 F.3d 1333, 1344 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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REPORTED CASES: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
THE APPLICATIONS DATASET

THE
OF

Of course, litigated cases, let alone those that proceed to a final disposition, represent only a small—and perhaps misleading—part of the universe
of trademark interests that might be affected by the advent of dilution law.
For example, one might argue that the overwhelming failure of dilution
claims in inter partes proceedings before the TTAB merely demonstrates
that the creation of anti-dilution rights has been enormously successful in
weeding out dilutive trademark applications earlier in the registration process. One could imagine multiple mechanisms for such a weeding-out process: anti-dilution protections might deter would-be registrants from even
attempting to register dilutive trademarks, or they might lead examiners to
surreptitiously treat dilutive applications unfavorably at the ex parte examination stage notwithstanding the absence of explicit statutory authority to do
so. We fortunately have a new, voluminous source of data that can help shed
light on such theories: the PTO’s Trademark Case Files Dataset (the PTO
Dataset). This Part will attempt to use these new data to determine how the
failure of dilution claims before the TTAB fits into the larger picture of the
effects of anti-dilution rights on the registration system. While the data do
not allow direct observation of the effect of dilution law in the registration
process, they provide some persuasive indirect evidence that the advent of
anti-dilution rights has not had an appreciable effect on applications for
which it might have been expected to do so.
A. Sources and Methodology
The ultimate task of this Article is to determine whether the advent of
dilution law has made any appreciable difference in the federal registration
system. Specifically, three questions are of particular interest:
1) Does the advent of anti-dilution statutes coincide with any
change in applicant behavior?
2) Does the advent of anti-dilution statutes coincide with any
change in previous registrants’ behavior vis-a-vis new
applicants?
3) Does the advent of anti-dilution statutes coincide with any
change in PTO behavior?
The word “coincide” is used advisedly here; due to limitations of the
available data that will be reviewed in this Part, it is difficult to generate any
causal inferences from the PTO Dataset alone. The ambition of the present
study is to provide a descriptive account of the relevant data and to see if
they suggest any plausible hypotheses.
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To answer these three questions, I propose to analyze the PTO Dataset,
released in January 2013 by the PTO’s Office of the Chief Economist.117 The
PTO Dataset has been described more fully elsewhere,118 but for present
purposes it is useful to go over its main features and its (substantial) limitations. The dataset contains information on approximately 6.7 million applications for federal trademark registrations dating from January 1870 to
January 2012. The older data is (predictably) less complete. Indeed, prior to
approximately January 1982 it is so incomplete as to be useful for only very
limited purposes, while the most recent data will not reflect the outcomes of
applications that are still pending.119 Still, the period of the most complete
coverage includes the passage of all federal anti-dilution statutes and lengthy
periods before and after their passage, so the dataset should be useful in
identifying any changes in practice that coincide with passage. More problematic is the fact that the PTO Dataset does not include data on the grounds
for an examiner’s (or the TTAB’s) refusal to register, for an opposition, or
for a cancellation petition.120 Accordingly, the data do not presently allow
for direct observation of dilution law at work in the registration system.
This is no reason to surrender, however, as there may be other means—
including indirect means—of observing the effects of dilution law. One possibility is to look to other sources of data, which was the strategy of Part II,
supra. Another possibility is to seek out proxies for dilution in the PTO
Dataset; this not only allows for indirect observation of the behavior of applicants and their adversaries (questions 1 and 2 above), but may also provide some information about PTO officials outside the TTAB (question 3).
Indeed, given the proscription of examiners’ explicit consideration of dilution as a basis for refusal to register, such indirect observation may be the
best way of detecting sub rosa consideration of dilution in the registration
process.121 For example, if we believe that examiners and TTAB judges
might seek to implement anti-dilution rights despite an absence of statutory
authority to do so, we might expect them to apply stricter scrutiny to non117.
See Stuart Graham et al., The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions,
Lessons, and Insights (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/Trademark
_Case_File_Data_Documentation_31January2013_final.pdf (describing the dataset). The actual data files and supporting documentation can be found at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/office
chiefecon/tm_casefiles.jsp.
118.
See id.
119.
See id. at 31–32.
120.
Hopefully this will not be a permanent limitation; most trademark registration practice now occurs online, often through highly systematized form documents, and therefore bulk
machine-readable data should exist and can hopefully be made available by the PTO in the
future.
121.
Cf. In re Time Warner Entm’t Co., No. 75/100922, 2000 TTAB LEXIS 229, at *16
(T.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2000) (reversing a distinctiveness-based refusal to register WARNER
BROS. for restaurant services to the owner of the same mark for entertainment products, citing
the expanded protections afforded to famous marks under the FTDA).
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competing uses of existing trademarks when considering other grounds for
refusal to register.
To try to detect such hidden changes in practice, I developed an algorithm to automatically code each application in the PTO Dataset by reference to the existence of prior registrations that might give rise to either
dilution concerns or traditional confusion concerns.122 To ease the analysis
and work with the most complete data possible, I coded only applications
including claims for standard-character marks filed on or after January 1,
1981, a total of 3,869,805 applications. The proxy measures generated by the
coding algorithm constitute four overlapping categories. The first category,
which I refer to as “Dilutive,” refers to applications that satisfy each of the
following conditions:
1) The applied-for mark text is identical to the text of a previously
registered mark (standard character or other) that was still live as
of the application’s filing date (the “Identical Mark Condition”);
2) The previously registered mark has no owner entry identical to
any owner entry associated with the history of the application
(the “Different Owner condition”); and
3) The previously registered mark does not cover the same Nice
Agreement international class123 as the application in question
(the “Different Class condition”).
Applications that satisfy the Identical Mark and Different Owner conditions but not the Different Class condition are coded as “Confusing.” The
coding algorithm also looks to see whether an application corresponds to a
prior registration owned by the applicant. Thus, applications that satisfy the
Same Mark and Different Class conditions but not the Different Owner condition are coded as “Extensions” (following the marketing concept of a
brand extension), while applications that satisfy the Identical Mark Condition but not the Different Owner or Different Class conditions are coded as
“Reinforcements.” Applications that fail the Identical Mark Condition and
122.
The relevant code is available as Stata do-files compiled into a compressed archive:
http://goo.gl/dwpiup. Loading the scripts into a Stata working folder with .dta versions of the
PTO Dataset files and running the master script titled “SheffDilution.do” will allow completely automated replication of all results reported in Parts III and IV, but casual readers
should proceed with caution. Due to the vast amount of data in the dataset, running the automated scripts takes a week or more of processing on a standard consumer computer. I have
included comments in the code to identify the most processor-intensive routines to allow replication efforts to be scheduled appropriately. Those who simply wish to review the primary
data files generated by my analyses may find them in a compressed archive at http://goo.gl/
mRXt4O.
123.
Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services
for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 23.2 U.S.T. 1336, 828 U.N.T.S.
191, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/.
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thus fall outside all four other categories will be referred to herein as
“Unique.”124 The assignment of proxy categories to each application observation by reference to existing, still-live registrations as of the filing date of
the application to be coded is summarized in the following Table:
TABLE 1. PROXY CATEGORIES GENERATED
BY ALGORITHMIC CODING
Same Owner

Identical Mark
No Identical Mark

Different Owner

Same Class

Different Class

Same Class

Different Class

Reinforcement

Extension

Confusing

Dilutive

Unique

There are some features of the PTO Dataset that seriously limit the
power of these proxy categories. First and most importantly, the coding algorithm relies on exact text matches; false negatives on the first and second
criteria (mark text and owner name) are therefore highly likely. This is particularly true for owner data, where minor differences in an entity name or
suffix may mask common ownership or control. I performed some data
cleaning on the owner data prior to running the coding algorithm in the
hopes of mitigating the problem,125 but many false negatives remain and I
have not taken further steps to remove them. As a result, applications that
ought to be coded “Extensions” or “Reinforcements” may be erroneously
coded “Dilutive” or “Confusing,” respectively. Moreover, these false negatives are likely to be especially problematic for large firms with complex
organizational structures or long lifespans—precisely the types of businesses
that would be more likely to attract free-riders on their brand equity. Because false negatives may also result from exact matching on mark text,
applications that should fall into one of the four proxy categories may not be
coded as such. And indeed, spot-checking of the data suggests that false
negatives in owner-name matching are a substantial concern, particularly for
famous marks. Part IV will report the results of a more targeted analysis that
overcomes many of these issues by operating on a much smaller scale that
allows for hand-coding.
124.
Strictly speaking, the marks claimed in this category of applications may not be
truly unique in the federal registration system. For example, they may be identical to previously registered marks that were abandoned or cancelled prior to the filing date of the coded
application.
125.
In particular, I standardized the order of personal names; removed most business
entity identifiers at the ends of owner names such as “Inc.,” “Corp.,” and “LLC”; removed
“The” at the beginning of entity names; and removed superfluous punctuation. The scripts
used to achieve this data cleaning are in the file ownerclean.do in the compressed archive of
Stata do-files discussed in note 122, supra.
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Similarly, requiring exact matches on mark text likely results in misclassification of many applications that the PTO would consider confusing
or dilutive. As demonstrated above, most successful dilution claims before
the TTAB do not involve identical marks: only two of the seven marks
found dilutive by the TTAB (CHANEL and NASDAQ) would be coded as
dilutive by this algorithm.126 Still, given the likelihood that dispositive
TTAB opinions may select for the most marginal dilution claims, and insofar as identical marks provide the most straightforward argument for confusion or dilution, aggregate analysis of them may provide meaningful
information. Moreover, the vast size and comprehensiveness of the PTO
dataset ensures that there will be sufficient exact matches to provide some
fodder for analysis.
Another potential problem arises from the use of the Nice Agreement
classification system to measure competitive proximity. The inclusion or exclusion of goods and services from one or another international class has
changed over time,127 meaning (for example) that the classifications of applications on closely similar goods or services at widely separated times may
escape the coding algorithm. Moreover, the Nice Classification is an inherently imperfect proxy for the kind of competitive proximity that marks the
difference between likelihood of confusion and dilution, which the PTO considers on a fact-specific, context-sensitive basis.128 Some international classes, such as Class 9,129 are so broad that even applications directed at goods
within this class might be considered too commercially remote from one
another to generate consumer confusion. The converse problem may also
arise; for example, the Nice Classification places beers in Class 32 and other
alcoholic beverages in Class 33, but there is case law to support a finding of
likelihood of confusion between beer and Scotch whisky.130 So again, some
applications may be mis-classified by the automated coding algorithm: Dilu126.
See supra Part II.
127.
See Nice Classification, Previous Editions, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/en/nice_archives.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
128.
See generally U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, TMEP § 1207.01(a) (Apr. 2014)
(“[T]he more similar the marks at issue, the less similar the goods or services need to be to
support a finding of likelihood of confusion.”).
129.
Class 9 includes “Scientific, nautical, surveying, photographic, cinematographic,
optical, weighing, measuring, signaling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus and instruments; apparatus and instruments for conducting, switching, transforming, accumulating, regulating or controlling electricity; apparatus for recording, transmission or
reproduction of sound or images; magnetic data carriers, recording discs; compact discs,
DVDs and other digital recording media; mechanisms for coin-operated apparatus; cash registers, calculating machines, data processing equipment, computers; computer software; fireextinguishing apparatus.” WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., NICE CLASSIFICATION - CLASS 9,
(last updated Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://web2.wipo.int/nicepub/edition-20140101/taxo
nomy/class-9/.
130.
See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155–56
(9th Cir. 1963).
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tive applications may be miscoded as Confusing (and vice versa); Reinforcements may be miscoded as Extensions (and vice versa).
Finally, as discussed above, anti-dilution protection at the federal level
has always been limited to “famous” marks.131 While, as previously noted,
the definition of “fame” has vacillated somewhat over the brief history of
federal dilution law, there does not appear to be any useful proxy for it in the
PTO dataset.132 This leads to two caveats. First, to the extent that the effects
of dilution law are indeed limited to famous marks, the analysis herein
would capture a great deal of irrelevant data—perhaps too much to allow
meaningful analysis of the questions of interest. Second and conversely, to
the extent that the effects of dilution law are not confined to truly famous
marks, there would seem to be little reason to think that dilution law would
have more predictable (or observable) effects with respect to its other criteria
such as competitive proximity or similarity of mark text. Again, the more
targeted analysis in Part IV will largely address this concern, at the cost of
operating on a narrower scale.
In short, the content of the available data imposes serious limitations on
the conclusions that can be drawn from it regarding the role of dilution law
in the trademark registration system. Accordingly, the ambitions of the analysis herein are quite modest. I seek only to provide a description of how, if
at all, rough measures of the interaction of mark similarity, competitive
proximity, and mark ownership shed light on the three questions of interest
described above regarding the effect of dilution law on the registration system. With all these caveats firmly in mind, we can proceed to look at the
results of the algorithmic coding process, determine whether they suggest
that the problems with the data are surmountable, and if so, whether the data
suggest that dilution law is having a substantial effect on registration. As I
explain below, I believe the answers to these questions are yes and no,
respectively.
131.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
132.
The only possible exception is a notation concerning acquired distinctiveness in the
Casefiles Dataset, but this is present only for a very small number of applications. Graham,
supra note 117, at 21, 33. Moreover, it is unlikely that such a notation would be present for all
marks that could establish acquired distinctiveness (as a far less burdensome showing of inherent distinctiveness would obviate the need to do so), and the evidence of acquired distinctiveness proffered to support registration would typically be insufficient to establish the degree of
renown among the general public that the PTO requires of a dilution claim. See Coach Servs.,
Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“By using the ‘general
consuming public’ as the benchmark, the TDRA eliminated the possibility of ‘niche fame,’
which some courts had recognized under the previous version of the statute.”); see also Toro
Co. v. ToroHead Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164, 1170 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (describing the high
bar for fame under the FTDA); Zabars & Co., Inc. v. Zabas Grill, LLC, 2008 WL 2817087, at
*6 (T.T.A.B. July 10, 2008) (“[E]vidence of regional or niche fame falls short of demonstrating that awareness of opposer’s products and services among those segments of the population
translates into widespread recognition of the mark.”).
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B. Findings
Table 2 provides a summary of the results of the coding algorithm described in the previous Section:
TABLE 2. SUMMARY

OF

AUTOMATED CODING

Not Reinforcement
Not Extension
Extension
Not
Dilutive
Dilutive

Not Confusing
Confusing
Not Confusing
Confusing

3,083,395
50,222
412,399
170,244

40,104
1,003
19,257
6,532

OF

PTO DATASET

Reinforcement
Not Extension Extension
43,783
2,366
12,626
8,017

8,809
667
6,131
4,250

Perhaps the most striking result in Table 2 is the number of “Unique”
applications in the analyzed data: 3,083,395 out of 3,869,805 applications, or
nearly 80%. Of the remaining 786,410 applications categorized, 639,456 are
coded as “Dilutive”—approximately 81% of the non-unique marks and by
far the largest category. Thus, roughly 16% of standard-character applications are dilutive under the three-prong test described in the previous Part—
not a trivial proportion. The next largest category, “Confusing,” contains
243,301 applications: approximately 31% of the non-unique applications or
approximately 6% of all applications coded.
Another important feature of the data is the significant overlap in the
categories. Any one application could fall within anywhere from zero to four
of the coded categories. There is some overlap among all the categories, but
especially among the “Confusing” and “Dilutive” categories. To summarize,
more than three out of every four confusing applications are also dilutive,
while slightly less than one in three dilutive applications are also confusing.
This is yet another reason why telling a causal story about the role of dilution law in the registration system would be somewhat difficult—interactions among the proxy variables will make it difficult to isolate any effects
of dilution specifically.133 Notwithstanding this limitation, the volume of
data is so large that we may still be able to arrive at a useful descriptive
picture of the application system and the role of dilution in it.
133.
In an effort to strip away these interactions a bit, I have reproduced the analyses
presented in Figures 4–16, infra, in Appendix B, infra, with the modification that I analyze
only those applications that fall into one of the proxy categories but not any other (i.e., confusing but not dilutive, extension, or reinforcement; dilutive but not confusing, extension, or reinforcement; etc.). The results of that analysis appear similar to those of the analysis in this Part
with respect to the dilutive category; the other categories end up having a much smaller number of applications in them but otherwise do not exhibit any startling differences.
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curs seven months after passage of the TAA, which would be an odd time to
see such an acute effect from that law’s passage. Moreover, the spike affects
all standard-character marks, not just dilutive (or even dilutive and confusing) ones. Thus, the advent of anti-dilution protection seems to be an unlikely cause of this brief spike in cancellation petitions. Rather, there seems
to be a more likely explanation grounded not in law, but in technology. To
wit: the PTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System website (TESS) went
live on February 29, 2000.135 If there was pent-up demand among trademark
owners for cancellation of competing registrations, it appears not to have
been directed against dilutive marks in particular. Rather, here we seem to
see a one-shot release of pent-up demand for cancellations in general, driven
by a one-time lowering of search costs through technological innovation.
This may actually be the most interesting result that emerges from this project, insofar as it suggests that technological innovation in the administration
of government, perhaps more than changes in substantive law, can meaningfully affect the behavior and experience of those who access government
services.
To return to the analysis of prior registrant behavior vis-à-vis dilution, it
is important to note that the TAA’s cancellation provisions apply retroactively, but only to registrations that were filed on or after the FTDA’s effective date. Thus, many petitions targeting dilutive registrations could not be
doing so on grounds of dilution, even if the petitions themselves were filed
after the effective date of the TAA.136 In Figure 10 below, we see the cancellation-eligible registrations in gray as a share of all cancellation petitions
targeting dilutive registrations in white. As one might expect, the proportion
grows over time as the share of all registrations that post-date the FTDA
naturally increases with the passage of time. However, there does not appear
to be any discontinuity around the passage of the TAA. Thus, again, the data
fails to suggest any change in petitioner behavior.

135.
Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Introduces New Trademark
Electronic Search System (Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/
00-14.jsp.
136.
Indeed, this limitation was grounds for at least one dismissal of a dilution claim by
the TTAB. See Moosehead Breweries Ltd. v. Otto Bros.’ Brewing Co., 2002 WL 575720, at
*1 n.3 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2002). On the other hand, the Board did hold that Congress intended
the TAA to apply retroactively to oppositions filed before the effective date of the TAA
against applications for registration applied after the effective date of the FTDA so long as
other prerequisites for leave to amend are met. See Boral Ltd. v. FMC Corp., 59 U.S.P.Q.2D
(BNA) 1701, 1703 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (“We conclude that the 1999 Act explicitly permits retroactive application so as to allow oppositions, brought against applications filed on or after
January 16, 1996, to be amended to include dilution claims.”); see also Polaris Indus. v. DC
Comics, 2000 WL 33321170, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2000).
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ence of truly famous marks in the registration system is called for. This Part
endeavors to provide such an analysis.
A. Methodology
I compiled a list of “famous” marks using a combination of data from
two sources. The first is the Advertising Age “Megabrands” ranking, which
has been published annually since 1989.142 The second is the annual “Best
Global Brands” ranking published by the Interbrand Group since 2000.143 I
used these sources to compile a list of brands ranked by the frequency of
their appearance in the top 100144 positions on each of these two rankings
over the entirety of their history. For purposes of this study, I am treating as
“famous” brands that meet either of the following two criteria:
• The brand made at least one appearance in the top 100 positions
on both the Advertising Age and Interbrand rankings at some
point in their history (59 brands)
• The brand appeared in the top 100 positions of the Advertising
Age ranking for at least 15 of the 20 years examined (27 additional brands)
Using regular expressions corresponding to the resulting consolidated
list of 86 famous brands145 (along with some common corruptions and variants, such as “COKE” for “COCA-COLA” and “BUD” for “BUDWEISER”,
142.
See, e.g., Megabrands Index, ADVERTISING AGE (June 23, 2008), http://adage.com/
article/datacenter/megabrands-index/106349/. Early editions of the Megabrands index were
provided by Crain’s KnowledgeCenter staff. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Top 200 Mega-Brands by
1990 Ad Spending, ADVERTISING AGE, May 20, 1991, at 22. I am particularly grateful to Kevin
Brown and Michelle Dopp for their assistance in locating and providing these older publications, and to Martin Cerjan and Aru Satkalmi for their coordination of that effort.
143.
See, e.g., Interbrand, Best Global Brands 2013, BEST GLOBAL BRANDS, http://www
.bestglobalbrands.com/previous-years/2013 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
144.
The first year of the Interbrand ranking included only 75 brands. Interbrand, Best
Global Brands 2000, BEST GLOBAL BRANDS, http://www.bestglobalbrands.com/previousyears/2000 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
145.
A few caveats about the limitations of the list of famous marks are in order. First,
the Advertising Age ranking methodology has changed somewhat over time, and in general has
been based on total advertising spending on a primary brand and all its sub-brands, not on any
survey of consumers. Interview with Kevin Brown, Director of Data Management, Advertising
Age (Feb. 4, 2014). Thus, it is biased in favor of heavily advertised product categories (particularly automotive brands), and may not capture precisely the type of fame the PTO considers
most relevant for dilution purposes. Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164,
1179 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“Fame for FTDA purposes cannot be shown with general advertising
and sales figures and unsupported assertions of fame by the party. . . . Parties claiming their
marks are famous must establish conclusively that the advertising has succeeded.”).
Second, the Interbrand ranking is based on a proprietary methodology designed to assess
brand value, not brand fame. See Interbrand, Methodology, BEST GLOBAL BRANDS, http://www
.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/2013/best-global-brands-methodology.aspx (last visited
Oct. 22, 2014). While there is some causal connection between these two concepts, see id.,
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and minor spelling variants of these brands and sub-brands), I searched the
PTO Dataset for matching mark text in all applications for standard-character marks filed on or after January 1, 1981. A complete list of the brands and
the regular expression search terms used is reproduced in Appendix C.
I then reviewed the search results by hand to identify applications that
satisfied two criteria:146
• The mark applied for appeared to be identical to, or a plausible
approximation or derivation of, the famous mark, and
• The applicant for the mark in question was not the owner of the
famous mark (or a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of that owner).
Having identified such third-party applications for registration of famous marks, I was able to measure the rate of those applications over time
and analyze various measures of how they fare in the registration process.
The results of that analysis are reported below.
they are not identical, and the focus on brand value biases Interbrand’s list toward luxury,
technology, and financial brands.
Third, the Interbrand ranking explicitly sets out to identify the most valuable brands with
a global presence, see id., while dilution doctrine at the PTO rejects evidence of extraterritorial
fame. See Fiat Group Autos. S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1113 (T.T.A.B.
2010). For this reason, I did not include in this study’s list of famous marks any brands that
appeared frequently on the Interbrand ranking if they never appeared on the Advertising Age
ranking.
Finally, it is notable that of the six cases in which the TTAB found dilution, only two
(Nike, Inc. v. Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011), and Warner Bros. Entm’t,
Inc. v. Campo, 2006 WL 2850871 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 13, 2006)) involved opposers whose brands
appear on this list—and in both cases the applied-for mark was a sub-brand (JUST DO IT,
HARRY POTTER) rather than the parent brand—thus neither would be captured by the analysis described herein. So the list of famous brands compiled for purposes of this study is somewhat underinclusive with respect to the types of marks the PTO might consider famous enough
to qualify for anti-dilution protection. Still, we should be fairly confident that the list includes
a representative subgroup of the most famous brands in the United States, and for that reason
is a useful tool in understanding how that category of marks fares in the registration system.
As the analysis below demonstrates, such marks appear never to have been in any danger of
dilution through third-party registrations, which may help explain the previous two Parts’ findings that dilution claims appear to be at best a marginal phenomenon in the registration system.
146.
These coding criteria, as well as the crafting of regular expressions to capture more
or fewer variants on a famous mark, necessarily involve some degree of judgment. For example, I have typically searched for instances of a famous mark or its variant only at the beginning of applied-for mark text. As another example, while the mark APPLE may be famous, it
is also a descriptive term in many compound word marks, so I purposely limited my search to
marks that consisted solely of the word APPLE (I take a similar approach with common surnames such as LINCOLN and PHILIPS). But for the less common mark GOOGLE, I searched
for any mark beginning with the word GOOGLE or with the alternate spellings GOOGOL and
GOOGEL. In order to make these and all my other judgments transparent, I have not only
reproduced the regular expressions used as search terms in Appendix C, but I have scripted the
process I used to sort through and code my search results in the Stata do-file “famousmarks.do”, included in the compressed archive of materials described in note 122, supra.
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C. Discussion
The data reported above suggests a small decrease in the success rate of
third-party applications for registration of famous marks, and moreover suggests that this decrease is attributable to something other than inter partes
proceedings—such as increased rates of abandonment or stricter scrutiny
during ex parte examination. Before leaping to such a conclusion, however,
several caveats are in order.
First, these apparent shifts in success rates may be illusory. Given the
small number of third-party applications for famous marks in any given period, the variability of their success is bound to be higher than the variability
of success for applications overall. Thus this apparent effect may simply be
an artifact of noisy data that might revert to the mean with additional
observations.
Second, these shifts, even if they are not illusory, appear small. At best
they would appear to suggest a 5- to 25-percentage point decrease in the
success rate of third-party applications for famous marks (relative to overall
application success rates). Even at the peak volume of registration activity,
this approximately corresponds to between 5 and 30 marginal failed applications per year, out of over 200,000 total annual applications. Even if such an
effect were causally attributable to anti-dilution protection, and even if it
were believed to be a benefit to the trademark system as a whole to weed out
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this small number of marginal registrations, we might still question whether
the magnitude of that benefit justifies the cost in additional resources directed to preparing for, entertaining, litigating, and adjudicating dilution
claims before the PTO.
Notwithstanding the small size of this potential effect and the possibility
that it is illusory, further study is likely warranted to determine whether any
causal inference is justifiable. It may well be the case that the availability of
dilution claims in registration proceedings does result in slightly increased
rates of abandonment of third-party applications for famous trademarks, and
slightly decreased publication and registration rates for those applications,
even while it does not appear to have had such an effect on third-party applications for non-famous marks. If this were the case, we might conclude that
dilution doctrine was serving its stated purpose in terms of outcomes: it
would be marginally reducing third-party uses that invoke (and thereby, it is
claimed, diminish) the “selling power” of a “famous” mark.149 Of course, we
might still question whether that purpose is normatively justified at all, let
alone in light of the costs it imposes on the registration system. But the fact
that this potential effect appears for famous marks, but not other marks, does
tend to mitigate some commentators’ concerns that anti-dilution rights
would lead to a free-wheeling “right in gross” in trademarks.150
Moreover, even if there were a causal relationship between the advent of
dilution law and a change in registration outcomes for famous marks, such a
relationship could not be reasonably inferred from the PTO Dataset alone.
This is because any control group we might construct from that Dataset
would also be subject to whatever incentives resulted from changes in federal law, and would therefore almost certainly be biased. Future research
may be able to lend support to such a causal inference, for example by comparing data from foreign trademark registration systems where such a legal
change has not occurred, or occurred at a different time.151 Such an investigation, however, is beyond the scope of the present Article. My ambition
here is simply to take the lay of the land; more thorough exploration is reserved for future work.
CONCLUSION
A comprehensive analysis of dilution law’s role in the registration system is overdue. While dilution doctrine has its detractors and its apologists,
few of the arguments raised in the debate over dilution rely on the actual on149.
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
150.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 466–67 (1994).
151.
For an example of this research design in the field of patent law, see David S.
Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Priority Rules: An Empirical Exploration of First-To-Invent Versus First-To-File (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/
wp/wp-content/uploads/centers/clbe/abrams_priority_rules.pdf.
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the-ground experience of those having business with the trademark system,
let alone of the registration system. This article has essayed the first such
analysis and suggests that dilution has largely been a waste of time and effort. It is an invitation to divert significant resources to litigating and adjudicating a new form of claim that is almost entirely superfluous. At best, the
payoff for this diversion of resources is to weed out a thimbleful of questionable registrations, while giving humorless incumbents an added tool to
stamp out the occasional irreverent joke brand.
One can be cynical and say this is precisely dilution’s intent: that it is
designed as a tax—or a threat—levied by powerful incumbents against all
other actors having business with the trademark system. But even if that
were the purpose of anti-dilution protection, it would not appear to be having
its desired deterrent effect on behavior. While this Article has eschewed
causal claims, the descriptive analysis herein does suggest that dilutive
marks are applied for at roughly the same rate, they are published for opposition at roughly the same rate, they are registered at roughly the same rate,
they draw oppositions and cancellation petitions at roughly the same rate,
and they withstand those challenges at roughly the same rate, as we might
expect them to even in the absence of dilution law. It may someday come to
pass that a more sensitive statistical analysis than I have attempted here will
prove that there is in fact a causal connection between dilution law and slight
changes in registration behaviors or outcomes (particularly with regard to
famous marks). But even if this were proven, this marginal and normatively
questionable benefit cannot justify the cost of adding another layer of claiming and disputation to the registration process. Rather, lobbying for antidilution rights has simply been either a mistake by trademark owners, or an
exercise in rent-seeking by powerful brand owners at the expense of other
trademark claimants (or worse, by trademark lawyers at the expense of their
clients). Perhaps underestimating how broad their existing rights already
were, dilution advocates have mainly succeeded in increasing the cost of
interacting with the trademark system—even to themselves. And according
to the data reviewed in this Article, they appear to have precious little to
show for it.
***
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